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PROJECT AQUATONE

PLANNING INFORMATION

TS #142636

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1. The ability of the USSR to wage offensive war is a primary factor which determines the preparations the United States must make for both defensive and offensive action. The United States lacks precise knowledge of the major economic, military, and political activities of the USSR. This lack of knowledge creates an atmosphere of uncertainty, provides an unsound basis for determining the National Defense program, and may lead to a state of economic and psychological tension which is unacceptable. Thus, the overwhelming need of the United States is that of securing reliable and conclusive evidence of the ability of the USSR to conduct war. This knowledge is a prerequisite to fulfilling our responsibility of maintaining the peace.

2. Aerial photography is recognized as being the most powerful single tool for gaining accurate information of the USSR. The Air Force is concerned with the problem of aerial photography as a portion of the reconnaissance mission. However, such a program utilizing current accepted aircraft is excessively dangerous due to the probability of detection and possible destruction. It also is unwise for one of the military arms to engage directly in extensive overflight of the USSR.

3. Relatively safe overflights are now feasible. An aircraft has been developed with the capability of operating at an altitude such that, if detected, it can avoid destruction by current Russian defenses. Thus vehicles to fulfill the need are available. We believe these planes can safely conduct aerial photography and that no amount of indirect or fragmentary intelligence can equal the positive information afforded by such a program. The opportunity for safe overflight may be anticipated for only a few years as the Russians will develop defenses to counteract temporary aircraft superiority. For these reasons we are vigorously pursuing a program designed to secure intelligence information by aerial photography of the USSR. TAB "A"

4. Our mission is to conduct extensive overflights of the Soviet Bloc in order to provide photographic [redacted] our tasks are to organize, equip, train and deploy overseas, units capable of performing our mission.

5. General direction and control of the project organized to perform our mission shall be exercised jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chief of Staff USAF. The project Headquarters is headed by a CIA Project Director, an Air Force officer serves as Deputy Director. This Headquarters will be responsible for continued research and development, operational planning, and the direction and control of operations.

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The Commander, SAC, will provide and coordinate Air Force support for the project including training. A subordinate SAC Headquarters has been established for this purpose. Command and coordination channels are as indicated in TAB "B".

6. Supporting functions within the Project will be organized as outlined in the attached annexes.

Annex 1	Political, Legal and Cover Arrangements
Annex 2	Administration
Annex 3	Security
Annex 4	Logistics
Annex 5	Medical
Annex 6	Communications
Annex 7	Weather
Annex 8	Intelligence

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ASSUMPTIONS

25X1 1. Rear, intermediate, and forward staging bases will be available in Western Europe, SW Asia and the Far East. Rear bases in all cases will be USAF installations where the facilities and personnel required for this operation can be installed and maintained [redacted] without the necessity of special additional arrangements with the local governments.

25X1 2. All pilots will be civilian. Maintenance, operations and support personnel employed at forward bases will be civilian or military personnel in civilian dress [redacted]

25X1 3. The USAF will supply general support to this operation. Housekeeping support functions will be performed by personnel of the permanent USAF bases. Airlift support will be provided by special USAF units.

[redacted]

5. Initial operations will be launched from bases within easy reach of the heavily populated areas of Western Russia and her Western Satellites.

[redacted]

25X1 7. Approximately twenty percent of the total sorties will be devoted to [redacted] visual spotting mission against high priority pinpoint targets. The remaining sorties (75%) will be devoted primarily to visual pioneer coverage. This is desirable for two reasons:

(1) Precise navigation to pinpoint targets will be extremely difficult as the pilot will rely largely upon dead-reckoning and pilotage for route navigation.

(2) Maximum visual coverage at usable scale is desirable.

[redacted]

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9. Priority considered, flight routes will be planned in areas where sun angle and weather will permit the greatest amount of photographic coverage. Route weather will be one of the major factors in flight planning.


10. For the purpose of determining equipment and personnel requirements a sustained operation is assumed. For the purpose of mission planning and priority establishment the possibility of having to cease operation at any time is assumed.

Activities under this project fall into three phases. First are the activities dealing with research and development, procurement, the construction and activation of a test and training base, the testing of equipment, and operational planning. These activities are well along. The second phase will be devoted to training and deployment overseas. The third phase is that of active operations from overseas bases.

In April 1956 the first operationally ready unit will be deployed to a base in Turkey to begin clandestine overflights of the USSR. It is probable that this first unit will also launch missions from forward staging bases.



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staging missions are not planned for the first months of the overflight operation. Staging missions will require that a maintenance and communications capability be moved to the pre or post-strike staging area. This will require in addition to the necessary arrangements with local governments, a considerable amount of support from the USAF in the form of airlift. The USAF will organize units to support each of our operational units. These units will provide logistics support at the home base as well as airlift during staging operations.

Control of our operations will be maintained by Central Project Headquarters in Washington. This will require that the Field Unit Commanders be given limited authority to plan and launch overflights. A considerable degree of control will have to be maintained, however, in cases where flights from one unit may conflict with those of another and when base facilities of another unit are required for staging.

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ADDENDUM 1.

1. Completion of Base Completed June 1955
2. All items are expected to become operationally available one week after delivery.

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Delivery Schedule</u>
1	25 July 55
2	19 Sept 55
3	17 Oct 55
4	21 Nov 55
5	19 Dec 55
6	16 Jan 56
7	9 Feb 56
8	6 Mar 56
9	30 Mar 56
10	25 Apr 56
11	21 May 56
12	14 June 56
13	9 July 56
14	30 July 56
15	17 Aug 56
16	9 Sept 56
17	24 Sept 56
18	9 Oct 56
19	23 Oct 56
20	6 Nov 56

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3.	<u>Engines</u>	<u>Delivery Schedule</u>
a.	J-57/P-37	
	1.	May 1955
	2.	June 1955
	3.	July 1955
	4 thru 5.	Aug. 1955
	6 thru 7.	Sept. 1955
	8.	Oct. 1955
	9.	Nov. 1955
	10 thru 11.	Dec. 1955
	12 thru 14.	Jan. 1955
	15 thru 17.	Feb. 1955
	18 thru 20.	Mar. 1955
	21 thru 23.	Apr. 1955
	24 thru 27.	May 1955
	28 thru 29.	June 1955
	30 thru 33.	July 1955
	34 thru 37.	Aug. 1955
	38 thru 39.	Sept. 1955
	40.	Oct. 1955
b.	J-57/P-31	
	1 thru 2.	Jan. 1956
	3 thru 5.	Feb. 1956
	6 thru 10.	Mar. 1956
	11 thru 15.	Apr. 1956
	16 thru 20.	May 1956
	21 thru 22.	Sept. 1956
	23 thru 28.	Oct. 1956
	29 thru 32.	Dec. 1956
	33 thru 37.	Jan. 1957
	38 thru 44.	Feb. 1957
	45.	Mar. 1957
4.	<u>Camera Equipment</u>	
a.	Configuration A-1	
	1 thru 2.	1 Nov. 1955
	3.	1 Dec. 1955
	4.	1 Jan. 1956
	5.	1 Feb. 1956
	6.	1 Mar. 1956
	7.	1 Apr. 1956
	8.	1 May 1956
	9.	1 June 1956

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b. Configuration A-2

1.	1 Oct. 1955
2.	1 Dec. 1955
3.	1 Jan. 1956
4.	1 Feb. 1956
5.	1 Mar. 1956
6.	1 Apr. 1956
7.	1 May 1956
8.	1 June 1956
9.	1 July 1956

c. Configuration B

1.	1 Jan. 1956
2.	1 Feb. 1956
3.	1 Mar. 1956
4.	1 Apr. 1956
5.	1 May 1956
6.	1 June 1956

d. Configuration C

1.	20 Jan. 1956
2.	1 Apr. 1956
3.	1 May 1956
4.	1 June 1956
5.	1 July 1956
6.	1 July 1956

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6.	<u>Pressure Suits</u>	<u>Positions</u>	<u>Date Operationally Avail.</u>
	1 thru 9	Test Pilots	Completed
	10 - 11	Co Det A	1 Nov. '55
	12 - 13	Op Off Det A	1 Nov. '55
	14 - 15	Off Det A	1 Nov. '55
	16 - 23	SAC Training Officers	1 Nov. '55
	24 - 35	Pilots Det A	1 Dec. '55
	36 - 37	Co Det B	1 Jan. '56
	38 - 39	Op Off Det B	1 Jan. '56
	40 - 41	Off Det B	1 Jan. '56
	42 - 53	Pilots Det B	15 Jan. '56
	54 - 55	Co Det C	15 Feb. '56
	56 - 57	Op Off Det C	15 Feb. '56
	58 - 59	Off Det C	15 Feb. '56
	60 - 71	Pilots Det C	1 March '56
	72 - 90	Add'l Pilots Det A	1 May '56
	91 - 108	Add'l Pilots Det B	1 July '56
	109 - 126	Add'l Pilots Det C	1 Sept. '56

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Phase 2

Phase Two covers activities dealing with training and deployment. Training will overlap activities of Phase Three. This overlap for a specified detachment applies particularly to training of individuals in the use of equipment which had not been delivered during the formal training period of the detachment. Training in such equipment will be conducted at the active operations base. Similarly, certain training of individuals will occur prior to entry of the detachment into its formal training phase. These activities are recognized as separate problems and for the purpose of this study Phase Two begins for a detachment with its entry into formal training [] and ends when its deployment to an overseas base is completed. Addendum Two lists this schedule.

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Addendum 2

(a) Detachment A

- | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| (1) Begin training | 15
1 December 1955 |
| (2) Complete training | 1 April
15 March 1956 |
| (3) Deployed overseas by | 15 April 1956 |

(b) Detachment B

- | | |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| (1) Begin training | 15 March 1956 |
| (2) Complete training | 1 July 1956 |
| (3) Deployed overseas by | 15 July 1956 |

(c) Detachment C

- | | |
|--------------------------|--------------|
| (1) Begin training | 1 June 1956 |
| (2) Complete training | 1 Oct. 1956 |
| (3) Deployed overseas by | 15 Oct. 1956 |

The date a unit completes overseas deployment and is ready to launch the first operational mission is established as "E" Day. Personnel phasing to overseas bases will be accomplished in accordance with the broad plan shown below.

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- E - 60 to E - 45 A small group of security and communications personnel will move into place.
- E - 45 to E - 30 A selected group of support personnel will move into place.
- E - 30 to E - 15 The main body of security, communications, maintenance, and operations personnel will move into place.
- E - 15 to E Day Remaining maintenance support and operations personnel. Aircrews and aircraft.

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Phase 3

Phase Three concerns active operations. The beginning of this phase for each detachment is the date for each detachment completing the first operational mission. Addendum 3 lists the target dates each detachment will enter this phase.

Addendum 3

Enter Phase 3

Detachment A	15 April 1956
Detachment B	15 July 1956
Detachment C	15 Oct. 1956

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